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Review of Oiva Kuisma, Proclus' Defense of Homer
Abstract
Since early studies of allegory by Buffière and Pépin, and J. Coulter's groundbreaking work on the
Neoplatonists, a number of important studies have been published on Neoplatonic literary theory,
including those by A. Sheppard, R. Lamberton, and J. Whitman.1 Oiva Kuisma has produced a further
contribution to this growing area of study.
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Atius. This choice was made complicated not only by the gross differences between
the intellectually complex style of Theophrastus and the telegraphic reports charac-

teristic of Diels' Atius, but more mundanely by the fact that Aetius had a lot to
say about philosophy in the first two centuries after Theophrastus' death. And so

Diels postulated an intermediate source for Aetius, the Vetusta Placita, which incorporated much material on Hellenistic philosophy. In the present volume M. and R.
have little to say about Aetius' predecessors, and in their stemma (p. 328) they refer
only to the "anterior tradition." But what they do say and what they have said elsewhere indicates that they will give us a much richer account than Diels offered, one
in which Aristotle, and perhaps Hippias of Elis and Plato, will play a much more
prominent role than they did in the prolegomena, and the intellectual point of collecting opinions will be much more stressed. It is not clear at this point whether the
third volume will try to do for Aetius what this one tried to do for his "successors"
and "neighbors," namely construct a stemma. I, for one, hope not. Much work remains to be done on the doxographical tradition and its intellectual impact, but this

book leaves me with the feeling that it will not be done best by focusing on the necessarily hypothetical reconstruction of a lost work or lost works. The focus seems to

me better placed on the works we do have, including collections of fragments, their
place and time, and, where reasonably clear, their interrelationships. M. and R. have
provided a rich supply of information and suggestions for undertakings of this kind.

But, although they criticize a number of post-Dox. Graec. editors for uncritical acceptance of Diels' Aetius, they also criticize the two twentieth-century editors of the

Plutarchan epitome for producing a text based almost exclusively on the manuscript

tradition and failing to "diligently record all significant variants of the entire tradition, both direct and indirect, so that P's [the epitome's] tradition is at least present in
the edition, even if it is impossible to place it all in the text" (p. 181). No doubt such

an enormous undertaking would be a very useful tool for research, but my inclination is to think that the proper starting point for reconstructing the doxographical
tradition is sound editions of individual texts based on the manuscripts for those

texts and produced independently of elaborate theories of derivation, interpolation,
and authorial or scribal error.
Ian Mueller

University of Chicago

Proclus' Defense of Homer. By OIVA KUISMA. Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum, 109. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1996. Pp. 157.

Since early studies of allegory by Buffiere and Pepin, and J. Coulter's groundbreaking work on the Neoplatonists, a number of important studies have been
published on Neoplatonic literary theory, including those by A. Sheppard, R. Lam-

berton, and J. Whitman.' Oiva Kuisma has produced a further contribution to this
growing area of study.
1. F Buffiere, Les Mythes d'Homere et la pensee grecque (Paris, 1956); J. Pepin, Mythe et allegorie
(Paris, 1958); J. A. Coulter, The Literary Microcosm: Theories of Interpretation of the Later Neoplatonists,
Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition, vol. 2 (Leiden, 1976); A. D. R. Sheppard, Essays on the 5th and
6th Books of Proclus' "Commentary on the Republic," Hypomnemata 61 (Gottingen, 1980); R. Lamberton,

Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth of the Epic Tradition (Berkeley,
1986); J. Whitman, Allegory: the Dynamics of an Ancient and Medieval Technique (Cambridge, MA, 1987).

BOOK

REVIEWS

115

The importance of Neoplatonic thought has been well established for over a gen-

eration. Plotinus' stunning remaking of the ancient thought-world has been granted
the prominent place it deserves in general treatments of classical philosophy.2 We
can only hope that general surveys of classical literary commentary will likewise

take account of the findings made in the last twenty years by the likes of Coulter,
Sheppard, Lamberton, and now K., and accord the Neoplatonists their place as pivotal thinkers in the history of reading. A few stumbling blocks remain in the way of

such a development. First, the most important Neoplatonic literary thinking is not
done by Plotinus. It is done rather by his followers, especially Proclus, whose work
is oftentimes dry and "scholastic" and occupied with numbingly fine questions of
ontology. Their work is not as widely translated or studied as that of Plotinus (who

certainly deserves the lion's share of the generalist's attention).3 Second, and perhaps
more important, there is a resistance, sometimes a strong resistance, to considering
the kind of reading that the Neoplatonists do (allegorical commentary) alongside the
other approaches to ancient reading that are customarily treated under the heading

of literary criticism. The Neoplatonists, along with the other allegorists, are sometimes seen as only "using" poetry to pursue their own agendas in philosophy or

religion.4 While it is surely the case that the Neoplatonists approach a literary tex
with philosophical issues and agendas in mind, it seems odd to remove them on
these grounds from our most general considerations of ancient approaches to the

task of reading imaginative literature. By the same rule we might exclude Dionysius
of Halicarnassus or Quintilian as only "using" the poets to elucidate their primary
interest, rhetoric. This view also neglects the many allegorists, including Crates,

Heraclitus the allegorist, Pseudo-Plutarch, and many anonymous scholiasts, who be-

long to no identifiable "school" of philosophical or religious thought, and apparently
have no particular philosophical or religious ax to grind. Nevertheless, one hopes

that historians of criticism need not select their material on the basis of whether an
ancient reader reads according to some modern definition of accuracy. Finally, following on the previous point, the Neoplatonists are sometimes said not to be interested in the literary text as a specifically literary text. This may be true if one defines

"literariness" in the way, say, Aristotle did. But readers have never reached general
agreement over how one should define such a thing; if they had, we would not have

competing schools of literary theory. Surprisingly, considering the pervasiveness of
the opposing view, many (one could even say most) of the allegorists give genuine

2. The work of A. H. Armstrong is most important in this regard. See, for example, The Cambridge
History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (New York, 1967), 195-269, where Plotinus is the
only individual figure accorded a full "part" in the eight-part volume on the period.

3. Proclus' Commentary on the Republic, which contains the most thorough surviving statements of Neoplatonic literary theory, awaits a published translation. Porphyry's short essay On the Cave of the Nymphs is
an exception to the rule, and has been widely disseminated, with a few breaks, since the Renaissance. The
most recent translation was produced by Lamberton (Barrytown, NY, 1983).
4. This view is pervasive. See, for example, G. Kennedy, Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. 1,
Classical Criticism (New York, 1989), 86, where allegory is cast as a "tool" of philosophical and religious
rhetoric; D. A. Russell, Criticism in Antiquity (Berkeley, 1981), 42, where the Stoic allegorists are said to
"use" poetry as a propaedeutic for philosophy, and 95, where allegory is said to "have to do more with the
history of religion and ethics than with that of literary criticism"; G. M. A. Grube, The Greek and Roman
Critics (Cambridge, 1968), 55-56, where the allegorists are said to "use" the poets as authorities "for their
own ideas"; and finally, M. B. Trapp, "Allegory," OCD3 (1997), 64.
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care and attention to what (by their own lights) are the unique properties of fictive
literature.5

If we broaden our most general accounts of the history of criticism to include the
Neoplatonists and earlier allegorists like the Derveni commentator, Chrysippus,
Cornutus, Heraclitus, and Pseudo-Plutarch, we would disprove certain truisms that
still linger around the field, such as that classical readers are interested primarily in
analyzing the effect of a poem on an audience, emphasize formalist and stylistic approaches, produce a criticism that focuses on composition, and generally use tools
and methods that were developed for the analysis of public speeches.6 Such a move
would balance the Aristotelian and rhetorical emphases that have guided the important work done in the field in the last few decades.7 The Neoplatonists, and earlier
allegorists, show us that not only rhetoric but also other areas of knowledge, like

philosophy, divination, theology, and magic, informed ancient approaches to the task
of reading a literary text. Until such time as their work is situated in the broader contexts of classical literary commentary, the Neoplatonists will remain something of
an exotic curiosity, and K. situates the material this way.

Proclus (410/12-485 C.E.), the last of the great Neoplatonists, produced the
school's most detailed and ambitious theories and interpretations of poetry. In the
course of his literary thinking, he entered the nettlesome problem of Plato's charges

against Homer and, like a number of critics before and after him, he tried to reconcile the two. K. chooses this as the point of entry into a wider consideration of Proclus' contributions to ancient criticism.

K. rightly places the category of the symbol at the center of Proclus' thinking on
literature, and in the first chapter examines the background for Neoplatonic symbolism. After a brief treatment of the Pythagorean contributions to the Neoplatonists'

symbol, K. finds the roots of the "symbolic" mode of thinking within Plato's philosophy. Plato's theory of ideas, his critical attitude toward written language, and his
use of myths in the dialogues, K. claims, nurture a philosophy of the unseen, where

one is obliged by the inadequacies of language to resort to reasoning by analogy, and
where real truth lies in a realm that cannot be fully captured in mundane things, but

lies always just beyond them. While it is certainly true that these features of Plato's
thinking encourage a certain figurative stance toward the world by suggesting that
the things we see are only reflections and shadows of hidden realities that underlie
them, this leaves us a good deal short of the conception of the "symbolic" as the

5. Commentators as various in their skills, motivations, and approaches as the Derveni commentator

(c. 400 B.C.E.), Cleanthes (331-233 B.C.E.), Cornutus (first century C.E.), Pseudo-Plutarch (first century
C.E.), Porphyry (234-c. 305), and Proclus (410/12-485 C.E.) repeat a more or less consistent view that
great literature's defining property is an extreme density of meaning, often derived from divine inspiration
(at several removes in the case of Cornutus), which makes it uniquely able to convey the most profound
truths the universe has to offer, about the cosmos, the gods, and the nature of human beings. They develop
their diverse strategies of reading from this generally consistent theoretical starting point. In my view, this
stance answers Aristotle's theory that literature is first and foremost a TgXV1, the examples of which should
be measured against a set of "natural" specifications such as genre, levels of style, schemes of tropes, etc.
Aristotle's great poet is a master-craftsman, while the allegorists' great poet is a master-riddler and savant.
This opposition between poet as craftsman and poet as inspired savant is already fully operative in Plato's
Ion. (See P. Murray, introduction to Plato On Poetry, ed. P. Murray [New York, 1996], 6-12.)
6. See, for example, D. A. Russell, "Literary Criticism in Antiquity," OCD3(1997), 869-71.
7. G. Kennedy has done the most to illuminate this tradition of ancient criticism. See, for example,
G. A. Kennedy, Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. 1, Classical Criticism (New York, 1989).
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later Neoplatonists envision it. The symbol carries a heady ontological resonance,
which K. elsewhere acknowledges, that Plato would have found hardly serious

enough for a sincere rebuttal. Proclus' symbol not only represents its referent, but i
actually reproduces it, in an arcane and mysterious way. Like a voodoo doll, it carries an actual ontological trace of the thing to which it refers, and becomes a pars

pro toto.8 Perhaps it is better to say that Plato's role in producing the symbol is limited to establishing the conditions of epistemological and ontological gap, or even
rupture, which the Neoplatonic symbol is meant to overcome.

A second chapter introduces some welcome consideration of Proclus' life, for
which our only source is the legendary account of his devoted student Marinus. K.
rightly relies on Marinus' hagiographic account to establish the sense among the
later Neoplatonists that they lived in a cosmos saturated with hidden correspondences and arcane meanings. Events never just "happened." They had a tale to tell,
since everything in the Neoplatonic world was connected by means of divine sympathy and providence to every other thing. One only needed to learn the great code that
underlay all visible things. Dreams, omens, and oracles abounded and begged for
interpretation, which the diligent philosopher provided.

The third chapter is K.'s strongest, providing a synthetic accounting of the ontological and semiotic dimensions of Proclus' world. After Plotinus, the Neoplatonists
understood the universe to be a great emanation or outpouring from the One, the
utterly transcendent source of all that is. Everything that exists carries some trace,
however faint, of its transcendent source. As K. explains, this ontology provided
uniquely fertile ground for semiotics. The material things we see are not just the
shadowy appearances that, according to Plato, always threaten to mislead us. For the

good Neoplatonist, material objects always have the potential to be manifestations,
revelations of the whole ontic superstructure of which they are only the basest indi-

cation, like the tips of so many icebergs of being. By the time of Proclus, the Neoplatonists had achieved a somewhat detailed picture of the way the universe was
arranged. Like rays from the sun, chains of being stretched out from the One and

penetrated down through the various strata of the cosmic hierarchy. At the upper lev-

els of being, right below the One itself, a ray manifested itself as an Olympian god.
This very same beam manifested different things as it shone through the levels of the

divine Mind, the divine Soul, and the encosmic levels that housed the daemons, heroes, humans, animals, plants, and matter. The basest material things, then, have hard

links in their very being to higher-order daemonic, psychical, intellectual, and even
divine entities. Proclus usually reserves the term "symbolic" to label the kinds of
semiotic connections that exist along these pathways of emanation.

K. mentions, but without sufficient emphasis, that the notion of symbolic connection is reinforced for Proclus by his religious practices, which K. is readier to label
magic than is Proclus himself. In the major theoretical statements of his notion of
the symbol, Proclus explicitly ties the literary "symbol" to another sort of thing that
the Neoplatonists called a "symbol"-a ritual token used to bring the full presence

of a god into a devotional statue.9 Proclus and all the Neoplatonists after lamblichus,
believed in a liturgical component to their spiritual exercises. They intended it as a
8. On theurgy in Proclus, see A. Sheppard, "Proclus' Attitude to Theurgy," CQ 32, 1 (1982): 212-24.
9. E.g., at In R. 1.78-79, 1.109-14, 2.241-42; Plat. Theol. 1.29; In Cra. 51, 71.
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supplement to Plotinus' strategy of pure contemplation. In the theurgic rite, the celebrant invokes the actual presence of the divinity by means of a material token, usu-

ally called the ov,u,okov or ot3v0r,a. This token, which was a rock, gem, plant, or
herb, was thought to exist at the end of a long ontological chain, which was linked
through various levels of reality to a divine being at the other end. After a proper

ritual, the actual divine presence entered the token and the statue into which it was

inserted.10 K. mentions, once more without sufficient emphasis, Proclus' reliance on
this hieratic paradigm in constructing his theories of the poetic "symbol." K. revisits
this point near the end of chapter 5, but again, all too briefly.

K. is stronger in chapter 3, on the category of myth. K. brings in evidence from
Sallustius, a figure somewhat less studied than his colleagues, and Plotinus, who is
sometimes overlooked in studies of the later figures, to attest that the Neoplatonists

view the material cosmos as, in a strong sense, a myth. The opposite observation
was made by Coulter, who pointed out that a poetic myth in Neoplatonic understanding is in some sense a whole microcosm. K. shows that the Neoplatonists from
Plotinus forward believed the reverse to be true too. Just as a divine myth presents
simple, atemporal, and transcendent truths in multiform, temporal, and mundane

forms, so too the cosmos unfolds from transcendent principles into the material
world we see around us. This side of the myth-cosmos axis emphasizes nicely the
readability of the visible world and the deep implication of semiotic values into
material things. K. adds the fine observation that the act of interpretation, not only

of myths but also of the cosmos itself, is at root a movement from the temporal to

the atemporal, from the mundane to the divine. This is a welcome observation since

it clarifies the uniquely spiritual and anagogic power that the Neoplatonists attributed to the act of interpretation.

In the third chapter, K. also includes some useful consideration of terminology.
K. does not use the term "allegorical" in describing Proclus' interpretations, since

Proclus himself seems to prefer the term "symbolic." This is fair enough, given the
special religious and ontological valences of the term for Proclus. But in counting

pure frequency of usage, the term av'yvtyga and its derivatives cannot be far behind
"symbol" in Proclus' literary interpretations. (Interestingly, as is the case for all the
allegorists, except Heraclitus, the terms aXkkryopia and U'n6vota are not the central
features of Proclus' "allegorical" vocabulary.)

K.'s fourth chapter covers Proclus' theory of poetry in the fifth essay of the Commentary on the Republic, a task which Anne Sheppard has undertaken in more de-

tail.11 K. emphasizes more strongly a psychological dimension to Proclus' theory of
poetry, where the main aims and effects of poetry concern the human soul. The great
poet does not simply entertain. In fact, pleasurable or delightful poetry is apt to be
frivolous, and lead a soul astray. Great poetry instead aims to raise the soul toward a
greater understanding of the Good and the One.

This leads into K.'s longest chapter, concerning the theory and practice of interpretation in the sixth essay of the Republic commentary. K.'s arrangement of the material
is solid and clear with some remarks on Proclus' methods of interpretation near the
front, followed by an admirably detailed classification and explication of Proclus'

10. On this whole topic, see Sheppard, "Proclus' Attitude."
11. Sheppard, Essays.
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strategies for reading sixteen cases from Homer that Proclus treats, including the
theomachy, the two urns, Agamemnon's dream, and the binding of Ares and Aphro-

dite. This is the standard fare of ancient allegorical reading-places in the text where
Homer attributes apparently inappropriate behavior or qualities to gods or heroes.'2

K. evaluates Proclus' readings along the axis of the literal versus the symbolic,
and claims that Proclus is more often literal than has previously been assumed.
There is a good point at the root of this approach, but it is obfuscated by a certain
confusion of terminology, to which I will turn in a moment. K. divides Proclus' in-

terpretations into three basic categories, those based on "cognitive relativity," those

that serve a pedagogic function, and those that are symbolic. The first category, despite the awkward name, works well after the careful reconstruction of Neoplatonic
ontology that K. has undertaken in chapter 3. "Cognitive relativity" is K.'s shorthand

for the Neoplatonic belief that the same thing appears differently at different levels
of existence. As we saw above, a chain of being emanating from the One manifests
itself differently in each level it penetrates, even though it remains, ontologically,

the "same" thing. So a divine ray that might be Apollo at the highest levels of reality
manifests itself as the sun at a lower level in the chain. Below that, this same chain

manifests Apollo's semi-corporeal demonic avatar, then the Apis bull, heliotropic

flowers, and the metal gold.'3 K. gathers several of Proclus' readings of difficult
scenes in Homer within this group, including tales of the gods' appearing in human

form. According to K., Proclus claims that Homer is providing a realistic depiction of
the way in which they are seen by human observers, who only see lower-order apparitions at their own level.

K. claims that Proclus has a second strategy of explanation. Here, Proclus at-

tributes pedagogical motivations to Homer's seemingly excessive portrayals of certain heroic behaviors, like lust, greed, irreverence toward the gods and toward fellow
humans. In these instances, K. demonstrates convincingly, Proclus uses arguments
from historical context, as well as parallel references in Homer's own poems, to

show that Homer's characters were doing nothing shameful according to the stan-

dard of their time. K. is right to point out that such strategies-historical relativity,
Aristarchan explication according to the maxim of "Homer from Homer," and philo-

logical commentary-did play a role in Proclus' strategies of reading. While modern
scholars sometimes betray the view that an allegorist who makes aggressive interpretive claims cannot, almost by definition, have had any interest in Homer's text or
historical context, Proclus and other allegorists, like Cornutus, Pseudo-Plutarch, and
especially Porphyry, present strong counterevidence.

Proclus' third type of interpretation, according to K., is the symbolic. Proclus is

likely to resort to the symbolic, in K.'s view, when the gods are depicted as being involved, among themselves, in anthropomorphic or even shameful acts. The category
of the symbol, and it's great referential power, is alone capable of transporting us
from such a base surface to the transcendent heights of divine meaning to which

Homer, in Proclus' view, soars. Here we get interpretations of the binding of Ares

12. On these topoi among many others, see F Buffilre, introduction to Heraclite, 'AllMgories

D'Hom6re," ed. F. Buffilre (Paris, 1962), xxxi.

13. Proclus rarely lays out the features of an entire chain systematically. The example of the sun chain
was reconstructed from the commentaries on the Timaeus, Republic, and Parmenides.
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and Aphrodite as the demiurge's (Hephaisto's) combining the unifying and the sepa-

rating forces of love and strife in the cosmos, and of the Olympians' provocations in
war as the manifestations of divine providence.

While K.'s typology is useful in its identification of varieties of interpretive strategies based on the subject matter being interpreted, it is compromised by an odd
insistence on maintaining the literal versus the symbolic axis of the analysis, even
though K. is well aware that such categories become extremely complicated when
we operate within an ontological scheme as different from our own as that of the
Neoplatonists. For example, when Proclus claims that the judgment of Paris indi-

cates his choice of the erotic life, how can we agree with K. that, "with the exception
of divine names," this interpretation is literal. Should we really classify as "literal"
Proclus' interpretation that Achilles' argument with Apollo is really an argument
with the demonic manifestation of Apollo? or as "practically literal" his reading of
the theomachy not as a battle of gods, but as a proof that lower avatars of the gods
are in providential contact with human combatants? Literal in what sense? When
supported by the architectonic ontology of Proclus, where the divinities and lower
order entities are different manifestations on the same rays of being, one might suggest a certain "literalism" in the sense that the relationship of sign to referent is an
ontological and not a figurative one. But this type of link is precisely what Proclus
tends to label "symbolic." K. is well aware of this, as we have noted. Nevertheless
the analysis returns repeatedly to this admittedly compromised opposition. Some
more explicit questioning of the usefulness of these very distinctions in Proclus
would have been most welcome. Just raising these issues is a useful contribution to

the field, but the final status of K.'s main argument-that Proclus is more literal than
we have appreciated up until now-will remain in doubt until such questions are
answered definitively; and we are some distance away from that point.

Why these counterintuitive claims toward literalism? K.'s larger argument is part
of a strategy to exonerate Proclus from the charge that he is prone to making exces-

sive interpretive leaps. In showing that Proclus has a "predilection for literal interpretation," K. hopes to shield Proclus from the dismissive treatment he has sometimes
received, based on the charge that his interpretations are absurd. Under this rubric,

the designations literal and symbolic acquire a normative valence, the former being
faithful, the latter being unfaithful, to Homer's text. While the thrust of the argument-that Proclus' interpretations merit our close attention-is admirable, this par-

ticular method of justifying them is somewhat troublesome. Need we claim that
Proclus' interpretations are justifiable by our own standards in order to justify study-

ing them? One hopes that this is not the case, but some such concern seems close to
the surface here.

K.'s penultimate chapter restates Proclus' fourfold schematization of the types of
poetry, perhaps the best-known feature of Proclus' literary theory. This is material
covered in more detail by Sheppard, though K. pays more explicit attention, again, to
Proclean psychology and ends with the welcome observation that Proclus' vision of
the symbol veers toward negative theology. This universe saturated in semantic resonances tends, ironically, to nurture a semiotics of "antirepresentation." When ontological connection replaces "likeness" as the criterion by which signs are read, then
things that are very "unlike" a referent can still carry some arcane connection to it.
Though K. does not make the link, the connection to Pseudo-Dionysius, and there-
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fore to the whole history of negative theology in Christian mystical traditions, is not
far afield here. 14

K. closes with an apology for Proclus against a characterization of him, hardly
still credible, as little more than a mystagogue. In this context, K. betrays a certain

defensiveness in justifying the negative theology toward which Proclus' symbolism
tends, saying that it is no mere irrationalism. K. neglects to enlist the supporting evi-

dence of the long and ongoing importance of just such thinking in Christian theology-from Pseudo-Dionysius (who appropriated the bulk of Proclus' thought c. 500
C.E.) to Meister Eckhart (for whom Pseudo-Dionysius' "negative way" is central) to

the contemporary thinkers Jean-Luc Marion and Thomas Carlson15-as well as in
continental philosophy, from Hegel (who was an admirer of Proclus) to Heidegger

and beyond. In battling against the reductive view of Proclus as a simple irrationalist, K. paints him as a rather straightforward rationalist whose religion was intellec-

tual and not emotional. Such categories can have little serious use in describing late
Neoplatonic thinking. To label Proclus as either a rationalist or an irrationalist attributes to him a strong stand on an issue that would not have presented itself to him
in such terms. It is, ironically enough, to do the same thing that the allegorists' de-

tractors attribute to them. It is to read our own philosophical concerns and interests
into the work of a thinker who wrote long ago in a very different world.

Peter T Struck
University of Missouri,

Kansas City

14. See B. McGinn, The Foundations of Mysticism (New York, 1991), 57-61; E. R. Dodds, introduc-

tion to Proclus' "Elements of Theology," ed. E. R. Dodds, 2d ed. (New York, 1963), xxvi-xxviii.
15. See, J.-L. Marion, God Without Being, T A. Carlson, trans. (Chicago, 1991) and T A. Carlson,
Indiscretion: Finitude and the Naming of God (Chicago, 1999).

